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Introduction and background 
Several articles in this special issue focus on the functioning of ‘white certificate’ instruments. Before 
introducing these instruments, several important questions should be clarified; what is the purpose of 
adding white certificates to the existing portfolio of instruments, does a white certificate system differ 
from other instruments, and in what respect, and how does this instrument work in the market, 
partially and in combination with the other instruments? This article focuses on the differences and 
similarities between energy market instruments. We then pose the following questions. Do we need all 
of these instruments, or does one instrument per goal suffice? In addition, how do white certificates 
compare with other instruments? 
Generally, the prices on energy goods in competitive markets reflect operating costs, shadow costs on 
capacity constraints, and the costs of capacity expansion. Most energy production and use brings about 
negative externalities. These can include emissions of greenhouse gases (fossil fuels), emissions of 
sulphur and particulate matter (fossil and bio fuels), aesthetics and noise (wind power), destruction of 
nature (hydropower), and radiation (nuclear power). Producers and consumers do not normally 
consider such costs. Correction of negative externalities is then an important argument for taxing 
energy extraction/production and consumption (Pigou 1920, Weitzman 1974, Sandmo 1975)1. 
Substituting taxes on factor inputs (labour, capital) by taxes on externalities may also increase overall 
efficiency (the double dividend, Sandmo 1975, Goulder 1995b). In the economics literature, first-best 
cost efficient instruments in the presence of negative externalities have been extensively discussed 
(Diamond and Mirrles 1971, Sandmo 1975, Ballard and Fullerton 1992). 
In a cost efficient approach, the environmental costs are exposed to all sources according to the stress 
they cause. Energy-related emissions will then fall through substitution between primary energy 
sources, the development and utilization of improved technologies in the conversion from primary to 
secondary energy, substitution between energy carriers, and more efficient technologies in energy 
consumption. However, direct taxation of externalities may be complex, cf. the additivity problem of 
capturing complex negative externalities by taxation in Sandmo (1975). A system of tradable emission 
permitted under a cap is a cost efficient alternative to externality taxes, given that the permit price 
equals the tax under the same externality cap.2 
                                                     
1 See also Wilson (1980), Parry et al. (1999), Weale (1992), Ballard and Fullerton (1992), Ballard and Medena (1993), 
Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994), Bovenberg and Goulder (2002), Felder and Schleiniger (2002), Goodstein (2003) and Aidt 
and Dutta (2004). 
2 Some of the literature highlights the differences between these instruments. See, for example, Bovenberg and de Mooij 
(1994). We do not go into these details here. Rather, we start out with the equality presumption as our focus is on other 
aspects of the implementation of these instruments. 
 4
Since taxes imply increasing costs, technology adjustments and structural changes (Ulph and Ulph 
1994, Goulder 1995a)3, competition, local employment, and income distribution may be affected (Bye 
and Hope 2006, Hoel 1995). To circumvent these effects, policymakers introduce exceptions from and 
countermeasures to the first-best instruments (Bruvoll and Bye 2003. Tax exemptions for specific 
groups and energy end users, free allowances of emission permits and discrimination with respect to 
both taxation and responsibility under a cap-and-trade system, reduced carbon tax rates and subsidized 
electricity contracts are all examples of divergence from the first-best solutions. A range of additional 
instruments are also introduced. These include renewable share requirements in energy production—
so-called green certificates (Amundsen and Mortensen 2001, Bye 2003, Menanteau et al. 2003), 
requirements for demand side energy saving—referred to as white certificates (Bertoldi et al. 2006, 
Quiron 2006), cap-and-trade for greenhouse gas emissions—known as brown certificates (Hoel 1998, 
Hoel and Karp 2001)4, and subsidies for renewable energy. 
In the literature, the partial effects of the introduction of different instruments are intensively 
discussed—see Ballard and Fullerton (1992), Jaffe et al. (2002) and Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994)5. 
The literature concludes that the partial effects of each instrument depend upon the elasticities of both 
demand and supply and the strength of the instrument. Some studies include the combination of taxes 
and subsidies (Goulder et al. 1999) while others discuss which instrument is best (Quiron 2006). 
Fischer and Newell (2008) assess different policies for reducing carbon dioxide emissions in the 
electricity sector and conclude that a portfolio mix of instruments may be optimal because of 
knowledge spillover. In this article, we show that all of these instruments work as combinations of 
taxes and subsidies through market effects. In addition, since the effects of the instruments depend on 
the demand and supply side elasticities, any instrument changes the technological composition. This 
implies that the instruments’ effects depend on the sequence of introduction; they are path dependent. 
Optimal taxation of externalities 
A direct instrument to internalize the costs relating to energy production and use is a tax equal to the 
marginal external cost. The tax sets a price on emissions, increases the costs of the production and 
consumption of fossil fuels, increases the relative profitability of non-polluting technologies, and 
changes the relative consumption between energy and other goods. The market minimizes the total 
abatement costs, and R&D in other technologies then becomes more profitable. 
                                                     
3 See also Goulder and Schneider (1999), Goulder and Mathai (2000), Jaffe et al. (2002), and Golombek and Hoel (2005). 
4 See also Jensen and Rasmussen (2000), Bertoldi et al. (2006), Böhringer and Lange (2005a, 2005b), and Hasselknippe 
(2006). 
5 See Goulder (1995a, 1995b), on taxes and subsidies; Amundsen and Mortensen (2001), Bye (2003), and Menanteau (2003) 
on green certificates; Bertoldi et al. (2006)and Quiron (2006) on white certificates; and Böhringer and Lange (2005a, 2005b), 
Hoel (1998), Hoel and Karp (2001), and Jensen and Rasmussen (2000) on brown certificates. 
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In Figure 1 we stylize the direct market effect of an externality tax on the production of a polluting 
(so-called black) technology; for instance, fossil fuel-based energy production. Total supply faces 
increasing marginal costs comprising the black technology, Sb, and the non-polluting (so-called green) 
technology, Sg. The willingness-to-pay is downward sloping, i.e., volumes increase with decreasing 
prices. In equilibrium, demand meets supply. The first-best solution to an external problem is to obtain 
the right prices, i.e., by levying a tax on the black technology equal to the marginal external 
production cost. The tax shifts both the supply of the black technology and total supply inward to S1b 
and S1, respectively. In the new equilibrium, the purchaser price increases (from p0 to p1*) and total 
demand is reduced (from x0 to x1*). The black technology output price decreases from p0 to p1b and this 
equals the purchaser price, p1*, minus the tax, t. The volume reduces from x0b to x1b. Since the green 
technology is not taxed, it receives the total purchaser price, p1*, i.e., the price for the technology 
increases as does output (from x0g to x1g). Hence, taxing the black technology implies a support to the 
green technology as profitability increases. The optimal solution internalizing total costs is at p1*, x1*. 
 
Figure 1. An externality tax on the production technology with a negative externality 
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Discriminatory taxation 
In practice, however, all energy carriers, including renewable technologies, involve some negative 
external costs (see Brekke and Bye 2003). For example, the development of hydropower and wind 
power parks has proven to be controversial as production negatively affects the aesthetic value of the 
landscape, involves physical intervention in pristine areas, and threatens wildlife. The taxation of the 
negative externalities (e.g., emissions from fossil fuels, for example, technology b in Figure 1) then 
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implies an indirect subsidy of other negative externalities (intervention in the landscape, cf. 
technology a in Figure 1). In fact, any discrimination implies indirect subsidies to less restricted 
technologies. Nevertheless, current European policy discriminates among environmental aspects. This 
eventually brings about excess consumption of favoured energy sources and excess environmental 
degradation. 
If the externality relates to the use of energy rather than production, the tax could be levied instead on 
consumption. When it comes to externalities related to renewable energy, they are typically linked to 
production. For fossil fuels, pollution is emitted in both the production and consumption process, and 
the externality that has been most emphasized—the emission of greenhouse gases—is independent of 
the location of the emission source. Hence, unless external costs vary, taxes should be equal over all 
consumers of fossil fuels. In practical energy policy, externality taxes are discriminatory out of 
concern for fair international competition among industries (cf. Krugman 1996 for the relevance of 
this argument). 
Figure 2 illustrates the effect of a discriminatory tax on a consumer with demand Db while another 
consumer with demand Da is exempt. Demand for consumer b shifts from D0b to D1b, and total demand 
from D to D1. This implies a decrease in the market price from p0 to p1a, which the remaining market, 
represented by consumer a, faces. Consumer b faces a higher price, p1b, equalling p1a plus the tax, t. 
The same argument applies for the supply side: the tax implies an indirect market subsidy for 
consumer b, i.e., a subsidy on the externality from this emitting source. That is, the non-taxed 
polluting consumer is indirectly subsidized. Her consumption then increases despite any externality 
associated with energy use. This counteracts the tax impact on the stated goal of reducing externalities. 
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Figure 2. A (discriminating) externality tax on consumption 
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For the purpose of practical policy, the discrimination usually favours the most price elastic 
producer/consumer, i.e., the industry is exempt or faces reduced carbon and energy taxes, while 
households face the highest tax rates.6 The less elastic the demand, the lower the effect on pollution. 
This increases the need for the introduction of additional instruments to combat emissions. After the 
tax, the total market demand elasticity is higher (the portion of less elastic consumption is reduced) 
and the effect of additional instruments has increased.7 
Brown certificates—tradable permits 
We can regulate externalities with either price (as with the exogenously set taxes described above) or 
volume. Optimal taxes should equal the (estimated) external marginal costs. The level of emissions 
will then be endogenously determined. However, it is typically easier to relate regulation to society’s 
perception of the optimal emission level. An alternative to carbon taxes is then a cap-and-trade system, 
so-called brown certificates. In principle, if all emitting sources were included, a cap-and-trade system 
could directly regulate total emissions as committed to in international agreements and the permit 
                                                     
6 Note that for the ease of illustration, the figures imply constant derivatives, i.e., elasticities vary along the curves. When we 
discuss differences in elasticities among consumers or producers and the total market, constant elasticities are more realistic. 
7 The demand elasticity ε measures by how many per cent demand changes when the price increases by one per cent; ε 
=(δx/x)/(δp/p). The more elastic demand is, the higher the elasticity. The total market elasticity is a weighed average of the 
individual elasticities. Hence, if the market share of an individual with relatively low elasticity decreases due to taxation, the 
average market elasticity increases. 
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price would equal the necessary tax to reduce emissions. According to the literature, this is in many 
senses equally efficient to a tax system.8 
Figure 3 illustrates the equilibrium in a market with two consumers, a and b, given a fixed number of 
allowances equal to the initial allocation A0a+A0b. The willingness-to-pay at the initial allocation is 
higher for consumer b than a (p0b>p0a). If trade is restricted, consumer a cannot sell any share of her 
initial allowances A0a, despite the greater willingness of consumer b to pay. Consequently, an 
efficiency loss (illustrated by the shaded triangle) arises. 
In a free market, the two consumers trade allowances along their demand functions, Da and Db, until 
the willingness-to-pay, i.e., the marginal abatement cost, equalizes at price p*. The outcome (A1a and 
A1b) is efficient and independent of the initial distribution of permits (A0a and A0b). As long as trade in 
the permits is unrestricted, total welfare is maximized. 
A tighter bathtub, i.e., lower total emissions and less permit allocations, increases the price and 
marginal abatement costs. Given a free market, trade secures cost efficiency in reducing emissions to 
the restricted level. This implies an implicit tax (shadow price) on emissions; therefore, the tighter the 
market, the higher the implicit tax. 
 
Figure 3. A permit market with and without free trade 
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8 See Footnote 2. 
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The initial distribution of permits among producers/consumers determines the distribution of the total 
value of the permits that occurs in a market with free trade. Both the assignments of free allowances 
(i.e., income transfers resulting from competitive concerns) as well as the auction of permits based on 
fundamental polluter-pays principles produce the efficient final allocation of permits, as long as there 
is no restriction with respect to trade. In practice, this policy proves hard to achieve. Given the 
preceding allocation of value through unregulated emissions, optimal trade and permit prices cause 
cost increases, reduced activity, and the closing down of firms, all of which appear as politically 
controversial. Free allowances are then not only used as an income transfer alone, rather as a subsidy 
for existing activities to keep them running. 
Several markets have implemented cap-and-trade systems for greenhouse gases, e.g., the EU emission 
trading system (ETS) (see, for instance, Bertoldi et al. 2006). In the pre-Kyoto period, i.e., from 2003–
2007, this system faced three kinds of problems. First, the total allocation of permits did not imply any 
real restriction on emissions. Second, the use of percentage-free allowances produced both production 
and investment inefficiency. Since some emitters9 received a percentage increase in the emission 
allowances if they increased production, allocation had an impact on behaviour. Third, a dynamic 
allocation rule, which may be employed, produce investment inefficiencies as the allocation for the 
next period increased with any increase in pre-period emissions. Another problem undermining the 
cost efficiency across sectors is that this market covers less than half of the total greenhouse gases 
within the EU. 
As in the tax system, a discriminating cap-and-trade regime implies an indirect tax on the restricted 
producer/consumer and an indirect subsidy on the non-restricted producer/consumer in normal, 
elastic markets. The subsidy element counteracts the impact on the stated goal—that is, to reduce 
emissions. Moreover, since the discrimination normally in practice favours the most elastic 
producer/consumer (industry versus households), the effect on pollution is low. The shadow price on 
the discriminated consumer increases when the cap constrains. As for discriminating taxes, 
discrimination in cap-and-trade regimes also serves as an argument for the introduction of additional 
instruments. 
Subsidies 
As described earlier, in the presence of negative externalities, the optimal policy may be direct 
regulation (for instance some local problems) or taxation (global problems) of the externality. In 
practice, a subsidy for less polluting, green energy sources appears more politically acceptable. While 
the underlying motive is to reduce the negative externalities from competing energy sources, this does 
                                                     
9 New and expanding enterprises 
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not yield efficient solutions to the externality problem. In the presence of positive externalities, 
however, subsidies serve optimal solutions. Typically, this applies to research on new technologies 
through learning-by-doing—see, for instance, Spence (1984), Hall and Howell (1985), Joskow and 
Rose (1985), Romer (1986), and Schrattenholzer (2002). 
We can frame a subsidy as a direct support to desired activities, i.e., direct lump sum transfers or feed-
in tariffs. It may also be framed as indirect support, such as differences in domestic and world market 
prices (resulting from trade restrictions), foregone resource rents in public projects (low discount 
rates), or prices lower than marginal costs (publicly owned enterprises/lack of pricing negative 
externalities). In the following discussion, we focus on direct subsidies. In principle, all other subsidy 
frames contain elements of the same impacts. 
The design of an environmental policy based on subsidies involves a set of challenges. These are: i) 
what technologies should be subsidized, ii) what is the extent of the total subsidies, iii) how does the 
technology objective interplay with other instruments addressing the same target, iv) what should be 
the relative effort on the supply and demand side, v) what is the market effect of the subsidies, and vi) 
funding the subsidies may introduce tax inefficiencies elsewhere in the economy and raises the 
question about the marginal cost of funds (Vennemo 1991, Håkonsen and Mathiesen 1997, Madsen 
and Sørensen 2002). 
Figure 4 depicts the same market as in Figure 1 with two production technologies (black Sb and green 
Sg). Rather than taxing the negative externality in the black technology, as in Figure 1, the government 
subsidizes the green technology, and the supply curve then shift outwards (S1g). Total supply also 
increases (from S0 to S1). The market equilibrium price decreases (from p0 to p1b). This lower market 
price works as an indirect tax on the black technology. Consumers benefit from lower prices, while 
black producers lose. The profitability of the green technology also increases. Further, the cheapest 
producers harvest a ground rent, i.e., a flat feed-in tariff is generally too high to just launch these 
investments. 
As the production of green increases and black decreases, this seems to be a favourable regime. 
However, contrary to the tax alternative, overall energy consumption increases. While the optimal 
quantity in the presence of externalities is reduced from x0 to x1* in Figure 1, the realized quantity with 
subsidies increases to x1 in Figure 4. Decreased purchaser prices also implies lower willingness to pay 
for new, potentially green but high cost energy technologies in the upper part of the marginal cost 
curve. 
In the presence of positive external effects, e.g., from research and development, prices should be 
corrected by subsidies. If such an externality is associated with technology g, the subsidy should equal 
the value of the externality s. Figure 4 then illustrates the optimal outcome. 
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Figure 4. A subsidy on the supply side 
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Figure 5. A subsidy on the demand side 
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Subsidies are also used to support particular parts of the demand side. These sorts of subsidies are 
generally not theoretically well founded. The arguments are rather that the subsidies reduce negative 
externalities in other parts of the market, but subsidies granted to insulation and low-energy light bulbs 
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and appliances to increase energy efficiency in residential heating do, as for supply side subsidies, not 
secure cost efficient solutions to the negative externalities. 
These subsidies are depicted as subsidies for energy saving in demand Db in Figure 5. Only one part of 
consumption (directly related to heating and insulation) is subsidized. As energy efficiency increases, 
part of the demand decreases, and the end-use demand curve shifts inwards (from D0b to D1b) as does 
the total demand curve (from D0 to D1). A lower total demand needs less expansion of supply (from x0 
to x1) at a lower marginal cost, i.e., prices decrease in the market (from p0 to p1). This original subsidy 
for energy saving then serves as an indirect subsidy for other end users and their consumption 
increases from x0a to x1a. This implies that the initial saving effect on energy from the subsidy is 
counteracted by the implicit subsidy element on the energy end users. If the subsidy is directed 
towards relative elastic demand, e.g., heating, the total elasticity of the energy market is reduced. This 
implies that the subsidy reduces the effect of other instruments applied to reduce energy production 
and consumption. 
Green certificates 
A green certificate is proof of an environmentally favourable origin of an amount of energy 
produced.10 This instrument particularly focuses on the supply side of the energy market. The 
government issues a green certificate to the producer for each unit of secondary energy produced by a 
green energy carrier. Consumers are required to purchase a number of certificates proportional to the 
total amount of their energy consumption. This creates a market for the green certificates. The 
producers of green energy harvest a certificate price in the certificate market additional to the energy 
price in the energy market. This increases the profitability of producing energy from green 
technologies. An advantage over a simple lump sum subsidy is the incentive for cost efficient 
investment for capacity expansion that this instrument creates. The system is then comparable to an 
auction-based subsidy system. 
Figure 6 illustrates a combined energy and green certificate market (for a more precise elaboration of 
the model, see Bye 2003). Assume a continuous supply curve producing a homogenous energy 
commodity based on two heterogeneous technologies with respect to the production of externalities, a 
green technology, g(p) and a black technology, h(p). This adds up to an increasing marginal cost 
curve, h(p) + g(p) (the supply). 
                                                     
10 Different kinds of renewable energy sources are classified as green; see COM (2000), Voogt et al. (2000), Voogt et al. 
(2006), Amundsen et al. (2001), and Jensen and Skytte (2002). Brekke and Bye (2003) discuss whether we can characterize 
any energy source as green. In European countries that have introduced a green certificate system, the definition and scope of 
the technologies differ tremendously. 
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Figure 6. The green certificate system 
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The increasing marginal cost of expanding capacity equates demand (f(p)) and results in an 
equilibrium price p0 and volume x0. The marginal costs of the green technologies (g(p)) are too costly 
to allow them to penetrate the market, x0g = 0, x0 = x0b. We then offer with these technologies a green 
tradable certificate with a potential market price pc. The certificate price now serves as a subsidy to the 
supplier of green energy and the supply of the technologies changes to g(p + pc). The total supply of 
energy changes accordingly to h(p) + g(p + pc). On the demand side, consumers are obliged to pay a 
part a of the certificate price for each unit of energy; this shifts demand inwards (f(p + apc)). The 
obligation to purchase certificates is then equivalent to a tax on consumption (the tax equals apc). The 
new equilibrium is (x1, p1). 
As the supply of green technologies faces increasing marginal expansion costs, the certificate price 
obviously increases by the obligated share of the green technologies. In addition, the energy price 
must decrease as the green technologies substitute for black energy. The lower share of black energy 
then competes at a lower marginal cost. 
The sign of the change in the purchaser price (energy price plus a share of the certificate price) is 
ambiguous and depends on the elasticities and actual obligated share. In this figure, the subsidy 
element is stronger than the tax element, so the purchaser price decreases and total energy demand and 
supply increase. Bye (2003) illustrates the point in a simulated numerical version of the model under 
increasing impositions of the green technology market share. Providing an increasing marginal cost of 
expansion for both traditional and green technologies hold (elasticities vary), the purchaser price effect 
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is negative, and the volume effect is positive when increasing the imposed green share, even if the 
production cost of green energy is very high. Increasing marginal cost in the traditional energy supply 
sector and equilibrium effects imply that the producer of traditional energy pays more than the 
incremental total cost for the green technology and thereby allows consumer surplus to increase. Only 
for strict environmental conditions, i.e., with a high share of green technologies, are the price effects 
positive and the volume effects negative. Such levels are less realistic in the near future, as 
investments take time. 
Then, a green certificate system also combines subsidies and taxes. The distribution of the certificate 
price (the “tax”) and the subsidy benefit among producers and consumers is ambiguous. 
White certificates 
While green certificates deal with the supply side, white certificates concern energy savings on the 
demand side. A white certificate system may impose a restriction on total allowable energy 
consumption for separate consumer groups. In practice, the restrictions are imposed on distribution 
companies or the energy suppliers (e.g., white certificate systems in Italy, France, and the United 
Kingdom). These invest in energy efficiency measures on behalf of their consumers, and consumers 
eventually pay through additions to energy tariffs. 
Figure 7 illustrates the functioning of a white energy certificate system. The willingness-to-pay for the 
two consumers (D0a and D0b) adds up to total demand (D0). For ease of explanation, we assume that 
one additive supplier (S0) represents all suppliers. A perfectly competitive market realises the price p0 
and consumption x0a and x0b for the two consumers. 
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Figure 7. The white certificate system 
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Now we impose an energy-saving obligation. Assume that the consumers have to save an equal share 
of their reference consumption. Demand then shifts inwards to consumption x1a and x1b. Since the 
elasticities of demand around the equilibrium price differ between the two consumers, the shadow 
price of this restriction also differs (p1a and p1b) and cost efficiency is not obtained. 
This is where white certificates—trades in energy savings—serve a purpose. If consumers could trade 
energy saving certificates directly, trade would continue until prices are equalized and the costs of 
energy savings minimized. In practise, the energy supplier takes over the saving obligation. The cost 
of energy-saving appliances adds to the energy cost, and the supply shifts inwards and twists11 to S2. 
The cost of energy savings among consumers will be minimized. Total consumption of energy equals 
the new supply of energy and appliances (p2, x2a, x2b). Compared to the initial restriction (x1a, x1b), 
consumer a demands less and consumer b demands more. Both consumers have reduced their demand 
compared to x0a and x0b, but in different proportions. In this sense, both consumers are imposed an 
equal ‘tax’ on their consumption (p2 – p0)12. Suppliers of energy-savings appliances receive a subsidy, 
measured by the units of energy saved, for the same amount. Suppliers of energy also face a “tax”.  
                                                     
11 Both the supply of energy and the supply of energy-saving appliances face increasing marginal costs. This implies both a 
shift (adding cost) and a twist (adding a marginal increasing cost) in the supply curve. 
12 An alternative picture could shift total demand parallel inwards so that the new demand equalised supply in x1 
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Hence, this is principally a combined system of a tax on the consumption and production of energy 
and a subsidy for suppliers of energy-saving appliances. Again, this instrument combines the two 
well-known tax and subsidy instruments. 
Standards 
In a perfectly competitive market, consumers invest in the most cost efficient appliances. This results 
in comprehensive combinations of technology choices. In some instances, politicians introduce 
standards for energy consuming appliances to stimulate and increase the relative competitiveness of 
green to polluting technologies. The introduction of standards, for instance, best available technology 
(BAT), imposes restrictions on consumption/production technology choices. Since the willingness-to-
pay, i.e., costs related to different technology choices, varies, standards imply varying shadow prices. 
In line with the initial regulation exemplified in relation to white and green certificates in Figures 6 
and 7, this implies differentiated taxes and subsidies among consumers/producers. 
Other relevant aspects 
Some primary energy sources, such as crude oil, gas, and coal, are scarce and exhaustible. Other 
primary energy sources, such as hydropower, face decreasing returns to scale. Both resources then 
enjoy scarcity rents and are perfect tax bases (Hotelling 1931, Kemp and Long 1980, Karp and 
Newberry 1991). However, a tax on scarcity rent does not cause inefficiency (with respect to either 
operating costs or investment in new capacity) nor does it correct for any externality. Hence, we must 
not confuse scarcity rent taxation with environmental taxes. 
The exercise of market power in energy markets power keeps volumes low and prices high, which are 
comparable to some of the tax effects. For instance, the market power of OPEC plays an important 
environmental role, not only in supplying oil, but also in keeping consumption and emissions down. 
Taxes on the monopoly producer’s product may then, contrary to intuition, play a minor role in 
combating pollution as the tax may instead compete for the monopoly profit. Taxation may reduce the 
producer price while the consumer price may change less and, consequently, consumption and 
emissions may change less. The conclusion is that the effect of a tax is not straightforward in markets 
where market power is exercised. 
Concluding remarks 
Many arguments vindicate the regulation of energy markets. Correction of market failures, harvesting 
resource/scarcity and monopoly rents, and pricing the use of transport infrastructure are the more 
important. International energy policy appears to be driven by concerns for climate gas emissions, 
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local pollution, nature conservation, and energy supply and security. Obvious instruments to be used 
to internalize these concerns in the energy market are taxes (prices on the negative externality), cap-
and-trade systems for emission allowances (if the externality is independent of its source), and 
subsidies to foster positive externalities through R&D. 
However, concerns about regional employment, economic activity, and distributional effects are 
important political issues that have partly hampered the introduction of cost effective instruments. 
Competing concerns have brought about extensive exemptions in the taxation of energy use and 
climate gases, and subsidies to protect partial interests. Discrimination of taxes and subsidies among 
actors implies that some non-taxed consumers are indirectly subsidized and that some non-subsidized 
actors face indirect taxation through market effects. Excluding some of the emitting sources from the 
internalization of costs reduces the effects of the instrument, and the political goals for total emissions 
are undermined. This is for both national and global instruments. Since energy markets are integrated, 
the design of instruments in one country interplays with the markets and instruments in other 
countries. Hence, evaluating the domestic effect of a support policy is difficult without also calculating 
the effect of the interrelationship between different interlinked countries. 
Generally, taxes prove both politically unpopular and undesirable in public. Subsidies appear easier to 
accept, but must be funded. Politicians are also concerned with alternative costs in terms of necessary 
reductions in other expenses to balance budgets and the costs of extra funding. Budget concerns then 
call for additional revenue-neutral instruments. Both green and white certificates satisfy this 
requirement. In the green certificate system, producers of environmentally friendly energy make a 
certificate per green energy unit. The certificate’s value is determined in the market, as consumers 
must purchase a certain amount of certificates proportional to their energy use. The certificate market 
ensures a cost efficient distribution of the total share of green energy. Policy measures are then limited 
to the definition of ‘green’ and the issue of certificates. Principally, this instrument is a combination of 
an indirect subsidy to green producers and a tax on energy consumption and a tax on non-green energy 
production. However, empirical illustrations show that under reasonable assumptions, the market turns 
the initial tax on consumption into a subsidy for consumers. Black capacity in the market then pays all 
of the extra costs incurred by the green objective. 
The white certificate system is principally a revenue-neutral system that addresses the consumer side 
of the market. If consumers are obliged to reduce their original consumption by a certain proportion, 
the shadow prices will vary among consumers because of different demand elasticities. Proportional 
reductions in demand do not then secure the optimal distribution of savings. The white certificate 
system introduces a system for trading energy savings among consumers, and cost efficiency is 
attained. In addition, this instrument serves as an indirect tax on energy consumers and a subsidy on 
energy-saving appliances. 
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All the instruments introduced to reduce energy use, resource extraction or the externalities from 
energy activities turn out to be combinations of direct taxes, indirect taxes, and subsidies. Even though 
the direct effect of an instrument may be obvious, the indirect market effects of even one instrument 
may be difficult to track. Introduction of several instruments that combine subsidies and tax elements 
may also have obscure and ambiguous effects on political measures. Discrimination in taxes and 
subsidies adds to this complexity. 
Generally, the effect of an instrument depends heavily upon the elasticities of the demand and the 
supply sides of the market. Instruments to change the level of energy demand/supply most often lead 
to investments in more efficient technologies and substitution to other energy carriers. Thus, the 
supply and demand elasticities change. In other words, the sequence of the introduction of the 
instruments changes the effect of the instrument itself. This increasing complexity calls for theoretical 
and empirical research on efficiency over several simultaneous instruments. Inefficiency losses and 
administration and transaction costs by holding a larger set of instruments probably call for 
instrumental reforms. 
 19
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